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ANDRÁS  SIMONOVITS
THE NEW HUNGARIAN PENSION SYSTEM
AND ITS PROBLEMS
Abstract
In January 1, 1998 a new, three-pillar pension system was introduced in
Hungary. It will replace about a 1/4 of the existing unfunded public system
by a funded private system from 2013. This transition is obligatory for
people entering the labor market after June 30, 1998 and optional for
others. Meanwhile the public pillar is also reformed. Pensionable age is
increasing significantly but smoothly, wage index-ation is replaced by a
combined wage-price indexation and the link between earnings and benefits
will be rectified between 2009–2013.
The official view is that it is this reform package which will make the
Hungarian pension system sustainable in the long run and will contribute to
the development of capital markets. The critics of the reforms, including the
author, underline several remaining and new problems: the public pillar
retains its weak points until 2013, the consolidated balance may deteriorate
rather than improve under the partial privatization and the welfare of the
old population will be relatively lower due to the decreased security.
Összefoglaló
1998. január 1-jén a felosztó-kirovó társadalombiztosítási nyugdíj-rendszer
vegyes rendszerré alakult, amely kötelezõ az 1998. június 30-a után
munkába állók számára, és választható másoknak. A jelenleg érvényes tb-
nyugdíj kb. 1/4 részét egy magánnyuddíjpillér váltja föl, amely a
tõkevárományosi elven mûködik. A megmaradó tb-nyugdíj-pillér maga is
egy reformsorozaton megy keresztül. A viszonylag alacsony nyugdíjkorha-
tár fokozatosan, de jelentõsen emelkedik, a régebbi nyugdíjak kereset-
indexálását kiszorítja a kombinált bér–ár indexálás; a járulékok és a
járadékok közti kapcsolat 2009–2013 között arányossá válik.
A hivatalos vélemény szerint ez az a reformcsomag, amely egyrészt meg-
teremti a magyar nyugdíjrendszer hosszú távú fenntarthatóságát, másrészt
hozzájárul a tõkepiacok felvirágzásához. Ezzel szemben a kritikusok, bele-
értve a szerzõt is, hangsúlyozzák a megmaradó és az újonnan keletkezõ
problémákat: a tb-nyugdíjrendszerben 2012-ig megmarad a jelenlegi prob-
lémák jelentõs része; a részleges magánosítás nem csökkenti, hanem növeli
a nyugdíjrendszerek egyesített egyenlegének hiányát; az idõsebb korosz-
tályok jóléte viszonylag csökken a megnövekedõ bizonytalanság miatt.1. INTRODUCTION
The Pension Law of 1997 has aroused the interest of the public as well as
the experts in the Hungarian pension system. But the Hungarian pension
reform is an ongoing process. From our point of view it is enough to go
back to 1992, when the present institutional framework of the Hungarian
pension system was set up and, however imperfectly, valorization of
assessed earnings and indexation of pensions were introduced. A second
important stage was 1996 when the long delayed but unavoidable rise of
pensionable age was enacted. Currently we arrived at the third stage: the
partial and step-by-step funding and privatization of the pay-as-you-go (for
short, PAYG) public pension system and the concomitant modernization of
the public pillar.
After a long discussion, in January 1, 1998 a new, three-pillar pension
system was introduced in Hungary. The first (far the largest) pillar is the
public system, the second pillar is the mandatory private pillar and the
third (far the smallest) pillar is the voluntary private pillar. These measures
can be summarized as follows.
(i) The public pillar goes under a series of reforms. a)  The
comparatively low pensionable age (55 years for women and 60 years for
men till 1996) is increasing significantly (to 62 years) but smoothly by
2009,  b) wage indexation of continuing pensions is replaced by a
combined wage-price indexation by 2001, c) minimum and partial
pensions are replaced by means-tested pensions, while degression at
assessed earnings of entry pensions is eliminated by 2009 and d) each year
of service worths the same and the accrual rates refer to gross rather than
net earnings from 2013.
(ii) The mandatory private funded pillar is being  set up from January
1, 1998. People entering the labor market after June 30, 1998 must join and
people not yet retired are allowed to choose this second pillar. After two
years of transition, people entering the second pillar have to pay about 1/4
(exactly 8/31) of their mandatory pension contribution to one of the many
private funds and at retirement will receive life-annuities. They will only
receive the proportionally reduced part (23/31) of the public pension
effective after 2012.2
(iii) The voluntary private pension pillar with huge tax exemptions
was set up in 1994 for those who want to save more for their old days than
it is mandatory.
According to the official view, it is this reform package that will make
the Hungarian pension system sustainable in the long run and will
contribute to the development of capital markets. It is of interest that other
Central European countries, notably Poland, Slovenia but not the Czech
Republic, follow suit. In contrast, the critics of the reforms, including the
author, underline several remaining and new problems:
a) the still dominant public pillar retains a lot of its problems until 2013,
b) the consolidated pension balance may deteriorate rather than improve
under the partial privatization, leading to further erosion of the public tier, and
c) the welfare of the old population will be relatively lower due to the
decreased security.
The present paper contains neither detailed historical and nor much
statistical analysis. The interested reader should consult Augusztinovics
[1993], Bod [1995] on the past, Antal et al. [1995], Augusztinovics [1995],
Martos [1995], and Réti [1996] on the reform ideas of the experts around
the Pension Fund. Augusztinovics et al. [1997] contains five European
country studies and several general topics, utilized in this paper.
Surprisingly, the official views have hardly been published in scientific
papers. The documents of the Ministry of Finance [1996] were not even
quotable during the pension debate. The remarkable up-dated survey of
Palacios and Rocha [1997] is still not published.
Considering the issue of welfare state, Kornai [1992] and [1997] urged
that governmental paternalism should drastically be diminished and
individual responsibility extended, while Ferge [1996] emphasized the
value of security in addition to freedom. Csontos et al. [1996] tried to map
the tax awareness of the Hungarian population, including the views on the
public pension system. Gál [1998] outlined the old pension system, Ferge
[1998] analyzed the "question marks" of the reform, while Csaba  and
Semjén  [1997] discussed the whole welfare system and its reform in
Hungary. Müller [1998] compared the Hungarian and the Polish reforms,
while Vittas [1997] surveyed the recent pension reforms in a lot of
countries. Of course, many contributions to the present volume also
contain related material.3
The present paper gives a concise description of the reform process
(Simonovits [1997]) and tries to elaborate its unsolved problems
(Simonovits [1998]). The international experiences are often referred to
footnotes. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the
pre-reform pension system as it existed between 1992 and 1997. Section 3
discusses the main features of the reformed system. Section 4 is devoted to
the remaining and new problems of the pension system. Section 5
concludes.
2. THE OLD PENSION SYSTEM: 1992–1997
The pension reform in 1992
As a socialist heritage, by 1990 almost every old-aged citizen has received
a relatively decent public pension: its average amounted to 66% of the
average net wage. Before jumping to the conclusion that this value, the so-
called replacement ratio was too high, remember that since 1970, the share
of wages in the GDP has been significantly declining: in 1991 it was only
40.8% (Palacios and Rocha [1997], p. 10., Table 3a). The defined-benefit
PAYG pension system in principle paid earnings-related pensions, but
massive redistribution and capricious ad-hoc measures resulted in a
dysfunctional system where incentives and solidarity were totally mixed
up.
As a result of contracting formal employment and the exploding
retirement, the ratio of pensioners to the employed jumped from 46.1% to
74.8% between 1990 and 1995 (Palacios and Rocha [1997] p. 4., Table 1).
Systemic changes and the transformational depression led to several
important changes in the pension system between 1989 and 1992. Formally
independent Pension Insurance Fund (for short, PI Fund) and Health
Insurance Fund (for short, HI Fund) were separated from the state budget
with their own Administrations and elected Self Governments.
In the emerging market economy the rules of pension contributions and
benefits had to be reformed, too. The Hungarian system, as most other
public pension systems, has remained a defined benefit system where the
benefits are paid from the inflowing contributions (Pay-As-You-Go). We
shall discuss first the benefits, then the contributions. Describing the4
benefits, we shall mainly deal with the own right old-age pensions, making
distinction between entry and continuing pensions.
Own-right pensions
To understand the logic of the determination of individual pensions, the
following aspects should be taken into account. In all public pension
systems, the determination of the entry and the continuing pensions are
separated from each other. An entry pension (i.e. newly awarded pension)
is an increasing function of both years of service and the average of
assessed earnings of the assessment period. The connection is described
by the so-called pension formula.
The Pension Law 1991 retained the degressive accrual rates of the
socialist era: 10 years of service meant 33%, every additional year up to 25
years meant 2% reaching 63%. Then every additional year to 32 years
yielded 1%, ending with 70%. After that the accrual rate dropped to a
meagre .5%.
The same law replaced the three year assessment period with that of all
years from 1988. It also introduced the (delayed) valorization of the
assessed earnings used at the determination of the entry pensions. The
assessment of earnings is strongly degressive.
For a large part of the newly retired people, even after contributing at
least 20 years, the assessed earning is so low that the pension given by the
formula is replaced by the relatively decent minimum pension (about 70%
of the minimum wage). For even less fortunate people with service years
between 10 and 20, the pension formula determines their partial pension.
The  continuing pension is generally a simple increasing (generally
linear) function of the previous pension. Similarly to the valorization of
entry pensions, since 1992, in Hungary (like in Austria and Germany) the
continuing pensions have also been indexed according to national average
wages.
The principle of indexation of continuing pensions, however, was
limited by the imposition of tight lower and upper bounds. Till 1997 the
relative increase in any (newly awarded or continuing) pension could not
be lower than a certain minimum (floor) and till 1996 it could not be
higher than a certain maximum (ceiling). Such a practice is efficient in
securing a relatively acceptable minimum pension but it is clearly
inconsistent with the insurance principle. This problem is especially5
serious as these often impressive nominal increases generally hid heavy
real term decreases.
If the valorization and indexation had not been distorted so
significantly by the mentioned and unmentioned factors, then the system
would have ensured that the various cohorts and strata have relatively
similar burdens and benefits, the principle of crying together, smiling
together be in force. But distortions were very strong (Martos [1995] pp.
230–231).
Because of the imperfect indexation and the sharp divergence between
entry pensions and continuing ones, different retiring cohorts have been
and will be treated entirely differently in Hungary.
Disability and survivors' pensions
Until now we have concentrated on the own-right old-age pensions. But
statistical data, displaying the structure of pensioners according to gender
and rights, show that about 70% of pensioners belonged to this category.
The remaining 15–15 % drew disability and survivors' pensions.
Let us make some brief remarks on these categories. The official data
for disability pensioners is much higher than our figure, reflecting the
Hungarian practice of keeping disability pensioners in this category even
after passing the pensionable age.
Obviously, the much greater number of women than men among old-
age pensioners reflects both the lower retirement age and the longer life
expectancy of women. Concerning widows pensions, it must be mentioned
that until 1998 many more widows received 50% of their husbands'
pension or the unified allotment. Similar laws applied for a couple where
only one of the spouses had an own-right pension.
We complete this subsection with a summary statistic: between 1991
and 1996, the replacement rate dropped from 64.4% to 57.9% (Palacios
and Rocha [1997] p. 11., Table 3b).
Contributions to pension
Almost as before, in 1997 an employee paid 10% of his gross wage to the
Social Security system, while his employer paid another 39%. Out of this,
"6%+24%=30%" of the gross wage went to the PI Administration and6
"4%+15%=19%" to the HI Administration.
1 More precisely, the
employee's contribution was limited to a certain amount, corresponding to
the maximum wage (twice the average wage since 1998), above which
there was neither contribution, nor reward. To diminish the contribution
base, the ceiling was nominally fixed for several years, making the
resulting ratio sharply diminishing from 3 to 1.6. The employer's
contribution was, however, unlimited, amounting to a disguised wage-tax
(like in other countries).
The transition to the market economy dramatically enlarged the
possibilities for fully or partly hiding earnings from various authorities. A
favorite trick of the employers has been to report the minimum earnings for
their employees and hand over the remaining parts under the counter or in
forms excluded from social security contributions.
The most surprising phenomenon of non-compliance was that large
government-owned firms, most notably the Hungarian Railways, failed to
pay their due contributions to the Social Security Administration.
Evaluation
During two-digit inflation, the pre-1992 unindexed system could not be
maintained. The indexed pension system introduced in 1992 have
remained comprehensive, more or less tolerable and inexpensive to
operate. It has relatively favored the poorest pensioners but paid too little
attention to the principle of social insurance. Like in other (but not all)
public pension systems, Hungarian citizens have seen less and less
                                                          
1 According to the public parlance, the contribution rate amounted to the intolerable
49%. First of all, this number is misleading, since the employee's 10% is included in
the gross wage, while the employer's 39% is not. In fact, only the net wage and the
total payroll have economic meaning. The net wage and the total payroll are about
70% and 139% of the gross wage, respectively (cf. Augusztinovics, [1993]). While in
other ex-socialist countries the employee's contribution is also much lower than the
employer's contribution (in Poland it is still simply zero), in Western countries they are
much closer to each other, and frequently (e.g. in the U.S. or Germany) they are equal.
In international comparisons, these obvious differences are frequently glossed over,
inflating the total contribution rates of ex-socialist economies. Just translating the
Hungarian parameters into German, the employee's, the employer's and the total
contribution rates would rise or fall to 21.4, 21.4 and 42.8% (from 10, 39 and 49%),
respectively. Similarly, the Hungarian average personal income tax rate 20% would
drop to 17% in a German translation. The difference between progressive marginal tax
rates is even higher.7
incentives to properly contribute to its financing, meanwhile they have had
expanding possibilities to avoid paying due contributions. Thus, it was
impossible to maintain the 1992-system in the long-run without thorough
reforms.
During the last thirty years the remaining mortality indices have
prevented a dramatic rise in the old-age dependency ratio. Without raising
the pensionable age (see below) the pension system would have faced
tremendous deficits even on a demographic basis. (At this point I cannot
resist to mention the wide range of long-run demographic projections.)
In addition, the expected slowdown of the inflation would weaken the
'benign' effects of partial valorization, raising the entry replacement rate.
The big unknown in the equation is the future development of the
participation at the labor market.
In summary: for given contribution rates and system dependency rates,
the present replacement rate would be too high. According to Palacios and
Rocha ([1997] p. 15, Figure 3a), the deficit of the public pension scheme
in the absence of reforms would reach the alarming 6% by 2050. A new
pension reform was inevitable.
3. THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM
Almost since the incomplete reform of 1992, there had been a general
agreement among experts and politicians that the new system should create
strong individual incentives in paying full contributions: personal accounts
and proper administrative or market valorization/indexation. There had
been a similar agreement that the pensionable age should be significantly
raised and at the same time, flexible retirement should be introduced. (Note
that flexible retirement requires strong incentives and disincentives.)
Experts had been divided, however, whether partial privatization of the
pension system was necessary or not. We turn now to the details.
Pensionable age vs. retirement age
According to the Pension Law of 1996, the pensionable age for women
will increase by one year in every second year till 2009. The pensionable
age for men is increased faster: 61 years from 1998 and 62 years from8
2000. The transition rules are quite elaborate but they will be skipped in
this paper.
An obvious effect of the raised pensionable age is that each year the
new  old-age demographic dependency ratio will significantly be lower
than the old one. Indeed, the numerator decreases, while the denominator
increases. But, as (Augusztinovics [1995]) emphasized, higher pensionable
age will not automatically increase total employment. In the extreme it is
even conceivable that every person working beyond the previous
pensionable age will prevent a young person to enter the labor market. The
decisive question is the level of labor demand. The issue of underground
economy is also important (Lackó [1998]). People working in the informal
sector do not pay social security contributions at all or only at a minimum
level. Among them the share of retired persons (frequently under the
pensionable age), is quite high.
But regardless of the labor market effects, with flexible pensionable
age, the total pension expenditure may be significantly reduced: some
people work and contribute to the pension system longer and retire later
and receive pensions for a shorter period; others retire as they would have
done before but they will receive lower pensions than before.
Combined wage-price indexation
As was mentioned in Section 2, since 1992 the continuing pensions have
been indexed according to wages. Since real wages diminished steadily
(apart from the temporary jump in 1994), this solution helped depress real
pensions, too. Since 1997 real wages have started to increase in Hungary
and there is a hope that this process will be sustainable. If the wage
indexation of continuing pensions had been preserved, then the pensions
would have increased in parallel with the wages in the future.
2
There was, however, a wide-spread conviction in the Hungarian
administration and World Bank that this solution would be too
advantageous to the old and it would place an unbearable burden on the
shoulders of the young. According to their opinions, there are only few
                                                          
2 In addition, in 1995, within the austerity program the principally correct method of
indexing pensions without delay was replaced by the indexation with delay just when
the nominal index fall very much behind the price index. With falling inflation this
solution only recuperates pensioners with a delay. To 'simplify' matters, after 2001, the
system returns to the simultaneous indexation again.9
countries which still have the luxury to index pensions with wages (like
Austria and Germany) and even these countries cannot maintain the system
for a longer time. The experts of the World Bank proposed the introduction
of price indexation which is effective in most developed countries (e.g. the
U.S., France and Great Britain).
The Hungarian experts and politicians, however, were not 'brave'
enough. The Swiss solution of half-wage and half price indexation was
accepted by the Hungarian pension law. During the bargaining process, its
full introduction was further delayed to 2001. During the transition, the
share of wage indexation remains much higher than 50% as a partial
compensation for the huge losses the pensioners suffered in the past.
As Palacios and Rocha [1997] p. 31, Figure 5) report, the combined
indexation of continuing pensions (with tax base expansion) and the
increased pensionable age could delay pension deficits about 2014 and
contain the deficit-GDP ratio at cc. 4% in 2050. (In somehow contradicting
this statement, the working material of the Ministry of Finance [1996]
which justified the new pension law, warned that the reformed unfunded
system should be healthy enough to bear the burden of the transition to a
multi-pillar system.)
Three-pillar system
The most visible part of the reform was worked out by the Ministry of
Finance in 1996, legislated in 1997 and introduced in 1998. Following the
ideas of the World Bank [1994] and [1996], it has created a three-pillar
system: (i) The first pillar is an earnings-related pension system – a down-
sized and reformed version of the earlier unfunded system. (ii) The second
pillar is a mandatory, privately managed funded system where every
insuree has to choose a privately managed pension fund, which invests his
contributions and returns the yields to the contributor as life-annuities at
retirement. (iii) The third pillar accumulates voluntary mutual retirement
savings.
We shall only touch the most important features. Moreover, we
neglect the rather complex transition rules for people who are just retiring
around 1998.
(i) For people who has already retired, the earlier pension system
remains in effect, but its dynamics is moderated by the combined
indexation. People retiring from 1997 already have incentives for longer10
service. (The accrual rates, at which the years of service affect entry
pensions, remain low in the medium interval of 25 to 32 years but increase
in the upper interval from .5 to 1 or 1.5%.)
3 A large part of the present
disincentives, however, survives until 2009, when uniform accrual rates
will be introduced or even till the end of 2012 when the weakening
degression at the assessment of the earnings will be finally eliminated. The
delay at valorization remains, it is only to be hoped that its effect will be
diminished with the elimination of high inflation.
In summary, for people who retire after 2012, the first pillar will be
streamlined. Degression will disappear from the pension formula, the
accrual rates will be uniform and net earnings will be replaced by gross
earnings, with the corresponding adjustment of the accrual rates: 1.65%
per year for those people, who remain in the old system. Not knowing the
future of the personal income tax system, it is very difficult to make
meaningful and reliable comparisons with the previous system.
(ii) The second pillar was opened on January 1, 1998 with a pension
contribution rate 6% to the individual funds. By 2000, the compulsory
contribution rate will reach 8% and the compulsory contribution rate to the
first pillar will diminish to 23% for the participants of the new system.
Because in 1998 the employee's contribution rate is only 7% and the
employer's contribution rate is 24%, some complex manipulation is
necessary to assign the employer's rate to the first pillar and the employee's
rate to the second pillar.
4
A peculiar institution called private pension fund will be set up which
will be the property of the insurees. There will be open and closed funds.
According to the law, the members can change funds with minimal losses
in their accumulated capital, but it is highly uncertain if this idea is realized
or not.
The funds will be encouraged to invest in the capital markets. There
are great expectations that this long-term investments will contribute to the
development of capital markets. According to calculations, by 2050, the
                                                          
3 It is characteristic for the negligence of the administrators that this raise was not
counterbalanced by a general diminishing of the accrual rates.
4 The issue is further complicated by the fact that even in the mixed system, 1% point of
the employee's contribution rate of 7% goes to public pillar, to create a legal
framework to pay only limited sums for the otherwise unlimited employer's
contributions.11
capital to be accumulated in the hands of the private funds will be about
50% of the GDP.
As we know too well, there are winners and losers in this game. The
government cannot tolerate that poor people lose too much. Therefore, in
addition to the complex web of control, a yield minimum is introduced. If a
fund cannot achieve a certain minimal yield, it is closed down and its
members are transferred into luckier funds. We shall return to personal
guarantees later.
As people who entered the labor force before July 1, 1998 can stay in
the first pillar, the pure modernized public system will survive for many
decades. But the incentives will channel the bulk of the younger cohorts
into the mixed system.
The accrual rate of the mixed system (which is paid in the public pillar)
will be proportional to the weights of the public (23%) and the total
contributions (31%): 1.22%=1.65%x23/31 where 1.65% is the new accrual
rate of the pure public pension system.
For those people, who had contributed to the public pension system
before 1998 but joined the mixed system before 2000, this reduced rate
will be assigned for the pre-1998 years. This reduction has a double
'justification': a) by participating in the new system, these persons get rid
of the remaining disincentives of the reformed public system and b) the
government cannot finance a too fast transition from the pure system to the
mixed system. Roughly speaking, this reduction determines that cutting
age: people born before 1957 are discouraged to join the mixed system.
5
If the sum of the first and the second components of a pension is lower
than the legal minimum, e.g. half of the average pension, and the
household of the person is poor, then he will receive a government
supplement to ensure the minimum. Another form of insurance takes care
of pensioners contributing at least for 15 years: the guarantee fund
(accumulated form the contributions of the members) supplements any
compulsory private pension up to the normal benefit, defined as 25% of
the corresponding public pillar of the mixed system. Denoting by 100 the
                                                          
5 The Hungarian campaign tried to avoid the sin of a similar British drive when millions
of would-be pensioners were lured into the private pillar although even ex ante the
public pillar would have been more advantageous for them. Even the conservative
government had to intervene into the 'free play of the market' and redress the balance.12
hypothetical pure public pension, the minimum mixed pension is
(100+25)x(23/31)=93. Thus nobody could lose more than 7% of his
eventual public pension by joining the private pillar.
At the retirement of a person, the life annuity payable from his
accumulated fund is compared to his normal benefit defined above. If the
ratio is higher than two, he can withdraw the surplus immediately. The
remaining part of the capital ensures one of the four forms of life-annuity:
(1) life-annuity for a single person, (2) life-annuity with inheritance within
a given period, (3) life-annuity followed by an inherited annuity for a fixed
period and (4) multiple life-annuity. The law prescribes that any member
can choose among the four variants but it does not say anything on the
indexation of annuities or the dampening of their fluctuations!
(iii) The voluntary pension pillar was already legislated in 1993. Up to
now it has still offered a huge tax holiday: up to employee's contribution
200,000 HUF (about the annual minimum wage or the average pension
contribution) there is a 50% tax deduction. The exemption to employer's
contribution is similarly high, creating a curious situation for the employer:
it is much cheaper to pay the worker indirectly via the voluntary pillar than
directly, via wages.
Before turning to the unsolved problems of the new system, we shall
discuss the motives of the reform.
Most experts accept that the transition from an unfunded to a funded
system is rather difficult, because during the transition the contributors
have to finance both a) the pensions of the people who have not
accumulated funds in the unfunded system plus b) the accumulation of
their own pension funds (see e.g. Kotlikoff, 1997). The transition is almost
impossible for mature systems, thus even the World Bank accepts that the
bulk of the Western European nations retain the dominant public pension
systems.
Officially, the Hungarian reform tries to solve this problem as follows:
a) to retain the unfunded system as the dominant pillar, b) to finance the
corresponding part of the  pensions of those people who have not
accumulated pensions in the unfunded system from government deficit
during the transition, c) a large chunk of the contributions to the funded
system would be temporarily used to finance government deficit by bonds,
d) to slow down the transition by making it optional and not particularly
encouraged for people born before 1957.13
The crucial assumptions underlying this reform are as follows: (i) the
interest rate on the government debt will be lower than that on long-term
investment of the pension funds and (ii) the remaining unfunded pensions
will grow much slower than otherwise, because of the raised pensionable
age and the introduction of the combined wage and price indexation.
As  Palacios and Rocha [1997] (p. 37, Figure 9) report, the 'final'
reform package will delay deficits until about 2038 and contain
deficit/GDP at cc. 1.5% in 2050.
What are the reasons for the partial privatization? Nowadays there is a
wide-spread dissatisfaction with the dominant PAYG systems all over the
world (Kornai [1992] and [1997]). Some critics simply deplore the
politicians that they corrupted the first generations receiving public
pensions at the cost of the further generations by giving them a free lunch.
Other critics realize that after the stormy years of the Great Depression in
the U.S.A. and World War Two in Europe, there was simply no other
option than to start a PAYG system but they find the time ripe for
transition.  Müller [1998] argues quite persuasively that the partial
privatization of the pension system may have political rather than
economic reasons. It appeared to be much simpler to sell a mixed package
than a thorough reform of the PAYG to the public. Of course, the interests
of the financial sector should not be overlooked, either.
There is a popular theoretical explanation for the superiority of a
funded system: the internal rate of return of an unfunded system is equal to
the growth rate of the economy which is typically lower than the real
interest rate. (It is the irony of the history that Aaron [1966] used this
theory just to prove the opposite: the unfunded system was superior to the
funded one just because the growth rate of the economy was greater than
the real interest rate in the decades following World War Two.)
Having presented the new pension system, we turn to the analysis of its
problems.
4. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS
Section 4 addresses several problems of the new pension system: the
flexible pensionable age, the link between contributions and benefits, the
combined indexation of benefits (all concerning the public pillar), the
comparison of the macro-performance of the two systems, annuatization14
and the operating costs of the funded pension pillar, and finally the means-
testing and the lack of strategy.
Flexible retirement age
In Section 3 we have already outlined the obvious but nevertheless
significant advantages of the increased pensionable age combined with
flexible retirement. There is, however, a strange absentmindedness among
certain experts, evaluating this measure. When they speak about the
necessity of higher pensionable age, they generally fail to mention that in
practice the actual retirement age has been strongly declining all over the
industrialized world. Nobody knows what will happen to the labor markets
after the baby boom generation retires in Hungary, but it is highly probable
that a large part of the cohorts between the old and the new pensionable
ages will not find work.
Here enters the flexible pensionable age as is known for example, from
the U.S. practice. Within limits, anybody can retire before and after the
pensionable age, but his monthly pension will be downward and upward
adjusted, respectively.
It seems to be excessive, however, that these adjustments are to follow
actuarial fairness. There are at least two difficulties with actuarial fairness
in this context: (i) As Diamond and Mirrlees [1986] have demonstrated,
there are people who can simply not work longer and it would be the
denial of insurance to punish them dollar-for-dollar for early retirement. It
would be most unwanted to push even more people toward seeking
disability pension or becoming unemployed. (ii) It seems to me highly
probable that those people who decide to work longer (shorter), on average
have higher (lower) life expectancy and because of adverse selection, they
will gain (lose) more than what is actuarially fair.
The link between contribution and benefits
One of the most difficult problems of any public pension system is that it
should be attractive to the participants (individual rationality) and at the
same time help the needy (the poor, the disabled, the long-lived, etc.).
Most public pension systems achieve strong income redistribution,
wrongly assuming that this does not affect the degree of participation. The
critics of the PAYG system (e.g. World Bank [1994] and Vittas [1997] p.
9) claim that these systems generally achieve perverse redistribution from15
the poor to the rich, because of longer life expectancy and steeper earnings
carriers of the rich, the latter of which get excessive weight in the rather
short assessment period. I think that this view neglects the countervailing
tendencies, at least in the First and the Second Worlds: the poor are
overrepresented among the disability pensioners and, as we have seen
above, the actual pension is often a strongly degressive function of the
estimated earnings and years of service of the individuals.
Anyway, both types of redistribution weaken incentives. Experts,
favoring the privatization and funding of public pension systems, argue
that there will not be any redistribution in privatized systems. This is
expressed by Kornai [1997] as the emancipation of the citizen from the
tutelage of the state.
At this point I only want to make the following point: Palacios and
Rocha [1997] p. 40) emphasize that to make room for a redistribution-free
second (private) pillar, the Hungarian government should have weakened
the earning-benefit link of the first (scaled-down public) pillar. World
Bank [1994] went even further when it recommended that the transitional
countries drastically scale down their public pillars and transform them
into flat-rate pensions. (We will discuss the cost-benefit aspects of such a
system below. It is of interest that the pessimistic critics of the present
reforms are afraid that the emerging crisis of the public pillar will
eventually lead to such a solution.) The idea of a private pillar with strong
incentives and a public pillar without incentives is very curious since for
decades a huge part of the population will remain in the old system and in
the foreseeable future everybody  will receive the dominant part of his
pension from this public pillar.
6
For a moment, I would like to return to the problem of compliance.
According to the critics of the public pension systems (i.e. Feldstein
[1996]), people restrain their labor supply and look for fringe benefits or
leaving the system to avoid the burden of contribution to the highly
                                                          
6 I hope it is not superfluous to cite a champion of the privatization of Social Security
(Kotlikoff [1997]) on the virtues of a public system with strong incentives: "The
smaller the pension fund system's marginal benefit-contribution linkage, the larger are
the chances that privatizing pension fund can support an efficiency gain. ... Note that ...
the fact that pension fund is financed at the macro level on a pay-as-you-go basis does
not preclude establishing a tight and transparent linkage between ... benefits and
contribution... ". It appears that the German point system solved this problem quite
well and could have been used in Hungary, too (Réti [1993]).16
redistributive system. Due to the high share of hidden economy (Lackó
[1998] estimates its share in the GDP cc. 30%), in Hungary the non-
compliance is a very serious problem. But I find it naive that by the mere
privatizing a quarter of the pension system, the compliance would be much
higher.
7
Combined indexation of public pensions
In Section 3 I have already discussed the pros and cons of various
indexation rules. Here I return to this issue and also consider the
connection between indexation of benefits and replacement rates. In the
old system, where -- at least in principle, in the absence of the unnecessary
distortions  --, not only the valorization of the assessed earnings, but also
the indexation of benefits followed the wage-dynamics, the replacement
ratios for different cohorts were or could have been comparable. With the
combined (Swiss) indexation to be introduced in 2001, however, any
discrepancy between the dynamics of wages and prices inevitably
differentiates among retired cohorts. For example, calculating with an
annual 3% real wage increase, each retired cohort loses 1.5%  each year
with respect to the workers. I would like to know whether the calculations
on replacement rates in the new system take into account this problem or
they simply consider the newly retired. The calculations give the
impression of the latter.
It is of certain interest that the experts of the World Bank remain
dissatisfied with this solution: Palacios and Rocha ([1997] p. 40) prefer
deficit reduction to income maintenance: "Further steps such as a straight
move from wage to price indexation (instead of the 'Swiss' indexation
formula) would generate larger savings (or lower contribution rates) but
this has been rejected for the moment".
8
It is curious that the following option is not considered except in
Germany. If one has to reduce the average benefits with respect to the
                                                          
7 The Chilean experince is not encouraging in this respect, either.
8 We mention here the pearl of the conservative solution. On the initiative of Margaret
Thatcher in the U.K., the flat rate pension (both entry and continuing) has been price-
indexed since 1980. This way the real value of the per-capita state pension was fixed
for once and all, and any difference between new and old pensioners had been
eliminated. It is another question that this solution has been leading to a slow but
steady erosion of the relative value of the British public pension: the originally 20 % of
the average wage will diminish to 7% by 2050 (e.g. Johnson and Rake [1997]).17
wages, why not reduce smoothly the accrual rates but maintain wage
indexation. Of course, such an indexation is almost impossible with a
private pension system (although there is an intention to index private
pensions with public pensions), thus maintaining wage-indexation would
increase the share of the public pensions with age. But do we want more
relative deprivation in old age than will occur automatically?
Macro-performance in the two systems
In the theoretical debates the comparison of the funded and unfunded
systems have been playing a large role. If the presumed advantage of the
former over the latter is not realized, then the expected gain from transition
also evaporates or even turns into a loss. Therefore we shall return to this
issue now.
Remaining in the traditional stationary framework, Simonovits [1995]
discussed the weak spots of Aaron's argumentation. Augusztinovics [1995]
paid much attention to the non-stationarity of the real world. Different
cohorts have different cost/benefit ratios with respect to any reform,
making the simplistic steady state comparisons ill-founded. There is a
danger that during the transition from the pure system to the mixed system,
some cohorts will gain a lot, while others will lose similarly.
Among certain experts there are great expectations that the
introduction of the mandatory private and voluntary pillars will raise the
Hungarian saving rate. Vittas ([1997] p. 19.) emphasizes that this is
generally not true, because everything goes.
9
The following argumentation is more cautious. In the present
'favorable' demographic situation there is a window of opportunity to
accumulate a buffer stock (the so-called trust fund) and this accumulation
is more safe in the funded system than in the public one (Urban [1998] p.
393).
10
                                                          
9 There are countries with significant funded pillars and low saving rates (e.g. the U.S
and the Scandinavian countries), there are other countries with dominant public pillars
and high saving rates (Southern Europe) and there are still other countries with
significant funded pillars and high saving rates (e.g. Switzerland). The development of
the credit system and the changes going parallel with the pension reforms make these
relations rather complex.
10 It is noteworthy that in America there are heated discussions on the separation of the
trust fund of the U.S. Social Security from the budget deficit. It is also debated whether
the voluntary pension funds increase the aggregate savings or not.18
Annuatization of funded pensions
One of the frequently overlooked advantages of indexed public pension
systems is that they defend against longevity risk by providing indexed
annuities. As Friedman and Warshawski [1990] showed on the example of
US private annuity markets, which are very underdeveloped, the implicit
interest rate for annuity is much lower than the corresponding market rate.
One reason for that is adverse selection: insurance companies are afraid
that only people with better than average life expectancy buy annuities,
thus these companies charge higher fees than they would under a
comprehensive plan.
Although the Hungarian government will have about a fifteen years to
finalize the details of how mandatory private pension savings can be
withdrawn by their owners, it would be important to outline the plans as
soon as possible. Knowing the less than perfect information of the
Hungarian public, it would be important to dispel any misconception.
As was mentioned in Section 3, in the normal case, the corresponding
law is quite cautious and ensures that the initial value of the annuity is
acceptable. It is telling, however, that the law elaborates the types of life
annuity but leaves the issue of indexation open. Is it wise to allow
providing unindexed life annuities? What will happen to those unfortunate
pensioners who will live 20–30 years after retirement and experience an
annual loss of real value 2% in their private pensions?
11
It is also of interest that the most ardent critics of the public pension
systems object to the growing annuitization of the income of the elderly.
Among other things, this otherwise beneficial tendency is blamed for the
dramatically falling US saving ratio. It is characteristic that quite recently
                                                          
11 Up to now we have only the Chilean experience for a nationwide privately-run
compulsory annuity-market. The Chilean system offers two solutions to the retiree: (i)
either he buys an inflation-indexed annuity or (ii) he annually withdraws an amount
which is consistent with his remaining capital and the remaining life expectancy. On
the one hand, this dual system may please the partisans of 'free choice'; on the other
hand, it creates a double danger: (a) via the adverse selection, it may incite only people
with high life expectancy to buy annuities, making the purchase more expensive than
would be without free choice; (b) people, not understanding the quite involved notion
of conditional remaining life expectancy, may end up with a rapidly decreasing
pension: according to Diamond and Valdes-Prieto [1993], it may diminish to half of its
initial amount. Furthermore, strangely enough, the same perverse income redistribution
appears with privatized annuities as with public pensions, because statistically, richer
people live longer.19
in the US plans were considered to get rid of annuitization, this last step of
"redistribution." 
12
If the problem of the annuatization of the various pillars will not be
solved properly, it would seriously distract from the expected benefits of
the private pension pillar.
At this point we return to the problem of survivors' benefits. The
propaganda, accompanying the introduction of the private pillar, put great
emphasis on the fact the contributions of the deceased persons are not lost,
because they are inheritable, at least during the accumulation period. This
is clearly an advantage over the public system if one considers a two-
earner couple without children or with adult children. What happens,
however, if somebody dies at the start of his carrier leaving behind a
widow with small children? Is the 'private property of the pension' still
advantageous? Continuing the discussion, what is the advantage of this
solution when the retiring person has to decide by selecting the form of the
life-annuity whether he considers his own well-being or of his family's.
Regardless of the annuatization, the volatility of the capital markets
can cause similar problems.
13 Is there any stipulation on this in the
Hungarian system?
The tax-rewards on voluntary pension
In Section 3 we have already mentioned the significant tax awards on the
contribution to voluntary pensions. Here we only return to this issue
because it has several implications. The first is connected with the lack of
                                                          
12 Feldstein and Samwick [1996] projected such a spectacular superiority for the private
pension system over the public one (real rates of returns of 9% vs. 2%, respectively)
which made insurance almost superfluous. After some fierce debates, however, they
have given up this idea (Feldstein and Samwick [1997]).
13 Following long years of success, the East-Asian countries capital markets have just
collapsed. But there is no need to consider semi-developed nations. Vittas ([1997] p. 6)
mentions the most developed countries, the USA and Japan. "A college professor
retiring in the United States in 1995 would have received from his or her individual
capitalization account with CREF a pension that would be 25 to 35% higher than (that
of) a professor retiring in 1994. In Japan, if college professor were relying on similar
arrangements, a person retiring in 1990 would have received a pension that would have
been 60% lower than (that of) one retiring in 1989. These fluctuations can be mitigated
by investing an increasing portion of funds in bonds as people near retirement and by
buying deferred and/or variable annuities (rather than ordinary life annuities).
However, the volatility of stock markets, which is also present in bond markets,
underscores the investment risk assumed by retiring worker."20
coherence between the different pillars. While the better paid employees
suffer from an unbelievably high degression (90%) of the highest interval
of assessed earnings, at the same time, those people enjoy an outstanding
reward in the third pillar. The absurdity of the solution is highlighted by
the fact that the exemption on the employers' contributions applies not only
to the pension component amounting to 24% of the gross wage, but also to
the health component amounting to 19%. I wonder if the experts of the
World Bank, otherwise favoring the private pillars, call such a solution
market-conform. Another problem is mentioned by Csaba and Semjén
[1997]: this solution opens a legal channel to grant pensions to those who
not contribute to the first (and second) pillar.
14 The American solution
appears to be much more logical: the tax for the voluntary contribution is
paid not immediately but only at using up the contribution, like the
Hungarian capital account. Of course, to apply such a solution, the
pensions should be taxable, at least in the private pillars.
Operating costs
Until now we have not mentioned the operating costs. The present pension
system operates at a too low cost, about 2% of the total revenue or
expenditure is spent as operating cost. (Too low cost means low quality
service and incomplete record keeping.) If the public pillar will be
modernized and every contribution and benefit will be recorded by a
computer on an individual account, then its cost may easily be doubled.
This modernized system could also be used for the private pillar. It is,
however, obvious from the Chilean and British data that the operation of
the emerging private pillar will cost much more than the would-be public
pillar. The formulation of the Hungarian official plan is rather tricky: the
cost consists of two parts, namely, 3% of the contributions and 0.5% of the
accumulated stock. To give an underestimation of the latter, calculate the
accumulated stock as the sum of 20 years of  contributions (i.e. with zero
real interest rate and growth), then we end up with 13% of annual private
contributions. Using the planned ratio 1:3 between private and public
pillar, this would amount to another 3–4%. In summary, the modernized
                                                          
14 The Czech system (Schneider [1998]) is an interesting polar case, which gives so little
reward (about 1% of the average earnings, divided into several brackets), that the
participants are almost brainwashed to contribute minuscule amounts. For such a
negligible amount there is no reason to set up a separate system.21
pension system will use up
7–8 % rather than 4% of the revenues.
International experiences foreshadow a much higher figure.
15
Unfortunately, the partial privatization of the Hungarian pension system
will not reduce the operating costs of the private pillar proportionally,
since a significant part is a fixed cost. And the start of such a system
requires a huge initial investment and recruiting and teaching of the clerks.
I only hope that its functioning will not be as messy as that of the personal
income taxation and the value added tax about a decade ago.
Means testing
Until now we have not discussed the problems arising with social
assistance. As a reminder, let us mention that in the old pension system (to
be valid through 2012) a relatively generous minimum pension is given to
those people whose deficient contributions produced too low entry
pensions. This solution will be probably replaced by pension without lower
limits from 2013, which will be completed by an old-age assistance.
This system will be in harmony with the rules of the European Union.
The poverty trap will remain, however. People with expected old-age
pension near the old-age minimum will have no interest to work in the
formal sector, because their contributions will yield zero or very small
benefits.
Strategy for the future
Turning from the details to the whole, I venture the following judgement.
The whole reform appears as the embodiment of the final truth and justice.
Accrual rates are given for 15 years ahead, personal income tax rates are
taken as final. If somebody did not know the history of the Hungarian (as
well as other) public finance system(s), he would believe that the perfect
system has been discovered and nothing would change it. The only
remaining problem is to forecast one's own future earning past and decide
                                                          
15 In Chile, about 3% of the wages, or about 1/4 of the total contributions, are spent on
operating the system. (Within this, the share of the marketing cost is on the rise. Vittas
([1997] p. 20) report an alarming nearly 60 % for 1997.)22
whether to enter or not to the mixed system. In my opinion, nothing is
farther from the truth.
16
I do not find any strategy which would define the parameters of a
sustainable system. And having a long transitional period, it will be very
difficult to change the announced values of parameters.
Let me finish with a quote from Augusztinovics and Jones ([1997] p.
270): "In conclusion, it seems unlikely that current pension reforms will
prove to be one-and-for-all, single, distinct acts, which unambiguously
mark out the path towards a predetermined pension system in the distant
future. More probably, transition will turn out to be a process of
adjustment to continuously changing circumstances and requirements, very
much in the way that pension system has evolved in the past. How to
maintain stability, confidence and how to avoid haphazard injuries to the
interest of various groups and cohorts along the route – remains a problem
to be solved."
5. CONCLUSIONS
Whether one likes or not the partially privatized Hungarian pension
system, now he has to accept it as a reality. On the one hand, the supporters
of the public pension system have to accept the partial privatization and try
to make it more rational. On the other hand, the partisans of the privatized
pension system have to realize that a full privatization would induce extra
taxes and debts, leading to stronger rather than weaker government control
over the citizen at least for decades. It is our common interest to pay more
attention to the expected difficulties and try to solve them before it is too
late or too costly.
It would be desirable if the new pension system were not worse than
the existing pension system for the bulk of the Hungarian society.
                                                          
16 The credibility of post socialist Hungarian governments has already been weakened
by several important acts, including the attampted elimination of favorable mortgage
rates (granted in 1991) in 1995 and the hysteric changes in the marginal income tax
rates and real values of brackets during the relatively short life-time.23
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Abstract
In January 1, 1998 a new, three-pillar pension system was introduced in
Hungary. It will replace about a 1/4 of the existing unfunded public system
by a funded private system from 2013. This transition is obligatory for
people entering the labor market after June 30, 1998 and optional for
others. Meanwhile the public pillar is also reformed. Pensionable age is
increasing significantly but smoothly, wage indexation is replaced by a
combined wage-price indexation and the link between earnings and
benefits will be rectified between 2009-2013.
The official view is that it is this reform package which will make
the Hungarian pension system sustainable in the long run and will
contribute to the development of capital markets. The critics of the
reforms, including the author, underline several remaining and new
problems: the public pillar retains its weak points until 2013, the
consolidated balance may deteriorate rather than improve under the partial
privatization and the welfare of the old population will be relatively lower
due to the decreased security.